Meter Bridge && Qubit Bridge

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发布于 2022-04-08 14:02:54

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发布于 2022-04-08 14:02:54

文章被收录于专栏：深入浅出区块链技术

本文作者：bixia1994[1]

💡 Meter bridge

交易 hash[2]

参考链接：

chainbridge-solidity-v1.0.0-eth/deployed_0421/merged at master · meterio/chainbridge-solidity-v1.0.0-eth[3]

Breaking down the Meter hack[4]

错误原因：

产生错误的根本原因是：meter 中针对 deposit 和 depositETH，emit 了相同的事件。但是在 depositETH 中，将 ETH 包装成 WETH 后马上转给了 handler，导致与 deposit 方法里对于 ERC20 的处理方式不一致，从而使得 handler 里面针对 depositETH 进行特殊处理。

即：跨链桥的逻辑应该是

用户 → 桥 deposit → Handler: transferFrom(burn/lock) → emit Deposit

用户 → 桥 depositETH: transfer WETH→ Handler (do nothing) → emit Deposit

⇒

用户 → 桥 deposit → Handler: do nothing

根本逻辑错误在于：handler 里 if (tokenAddress != _wtokenAddress) 导致

Handler:
function deposit(
        bytes32 resourceID,
        uint8   destinationChainID,
        uint64  depositNonce,
        address depositer,
        bytes   calldata data
    ) external override onlyBridge {
        bytes   memory recipientAddress;
        uint256        amount;
        uint256        lenRecipientAddress;

        assembly {

            amount := calldataload(0xC4)

            recipientAddress := mload(0x40)
            lenRecipientAddress := calldataload(0xE4)
            mstore(0x40, add(0x20, add(recipientAddress, lenRecipientAddress)))

            calldatacopy(
                recipientAddress, // copy to destinationRecipientAddress
                0xE4, // copy from calldata @ 0x104
                sub(calldatasize(), 0xE) // copy size (calldatasize - 0x104)
            )
        }

        address tokenAddress = _resourceIDToTokenContractAddress[resourceID];
        require(_contractWhitelist[tokenAddress], "provided tokenAddress is not whitelisted");

        // ether case, the weth already in handler, do nothing
        if (tokenAddress != _wtokenAddress) {
            if (_burnList[tokenAddress]) {
                burnERC20(tokenAddress, depositer, amount);
            } else {
                lockERC20(tokenAddress, depositer, address(this), amount);
            }
        }

        _depositRecords[destinationChainID][depositNonce] = DepositRecord(
            tokenAddress,
            uint8(lenRecipientAddress),
            destinationChainID,
            resourceID,
            recipientAddress,
            depositer,
            amount
        );
    }

当用户的传入的调用参数如下时：

Function: deposit(uint8 destinationChainID, bytes32 resourceID, bytes data)

MethodID: 0x05e2ca17
 //destinationChainID
 //resourceID
 //offset
 //len
 //amount
 //addr len 0x14=20
 //receipient addr

首先在 Handler 中（0xde4fC7C3C5E7bE3F16506FcC790a8D93f8Ca0b40），根据 wtokenAddress 查找到对应的 resouceID：

然后构造上述的一个交易数据即可。

💡 Qubit

参考链接：https://twitter.com/peckshield/status/1486841239450255362[5]

tx[6]

tx2[7]

错误原因：

用户 →Bridge: deposit (resourceID → ETH) → Handler: deposit (tokenAddress = 0)

当 handler 中，deposit tokenAddr=0, 其调用 safeTransferFrom 时，其会直接调用 STOP，返回 true，而不是 revert 或者 false。

即：

function safeTransfer(
        address token,
        address to,
        uint value
    ) internal {
        // bytes4(keccak256(bytes('transfer(address,uint256)')));
        (bool success, bytes memory data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0xa9059cbb, to, value));
        require(success && (data.length == 0 || abi.decode(data, (bool))), "!safeTransfer");
    }
当token不是一个合约地址时，比如一个EOA地址，其调用的call仍然会成功，返回success！

Bridge:
function deposit(uint8 destinationDomainID, bytes32 resourceID, bytes calldata data) external payable notPaused {
        require(msg.value == fee, "QBridge: invalid fee");

        address handler = resourceIDToHandlerAddress[resourceID];
        require(handler != address(0), "QBridge: invalid resourceID");

        uint64 depositNonce = ++_depositCounts[destinationDomainID];

        IQBridgeHandler(handler).deposit(resourceID, msg.sender, data);
        emit Deposit(destinationDomainID, resourceID, depositNonce, msg.sender, data);
    }

    function depositETH(uint8 destinationDomainID, bytes32 resourceID, bytes calldata data) external payable notPaused {
        uint option;
        uint amount;
        (option, amount) = abi.decode(data, (uint, uint));

        require(msg.value == amount.add(fee), "QBridge: invalid fee");

        address handler = resourceIDToHandlerAddress[resourceID];
        require(handler != address(0), "QBridge: invalid resourceID");

        uint64 depositNonce = ++_depositCounts[destinationDomainID];

        IQBridgeHandler(handler).depositETH{value:amount}(resourceID, msg.sender, data);
        emit Deposit(destinationDomainID, resourceID, depositNonce, msg.sender, data);
    }
Handler:
function deposit(bytes32 resourceID, address depositer, bytes calldata data) external override onlyBridge {
        uint option;
        uint amount;
        (option, amount) = abi.decode(data, (uint, uint));

        address tokenAddress = resourceIDToTokenContractAddress[resourceID];
        require(contractWhitelist[tokenAddress], "provided tokenAddress is not whitelisted");

        if (burnList[tokenAddress]) {
            require(amount >= withdrawalFees[resourceID], "less than withdrawal fee");
            QBridgeToken(tokenAddress).burnFrom(depositer, amount);
        } else {
            require(amount >= minAmounts[resourceID][option], "less than minimum amount");
            tokenAddress.safeTransferFrom(depositer, address(this), amount);
        }
    }

    function depositETH(bytes32 resourceID, address depositer, bytes calldata data) external payable override onlyBridge {
        uint option;
        uint amount;
        (option, amount) = abi.decode(data, (uint, uint));
        require(amount == msg.value);

        address tokenAddress = resourceIDToTokenContractAddress[resourceID];
        require(contractWhitelist[tokenAddress], "provided tokenAddress is not whitelisted");

        require(amount >= minAmounts[resourceID][option], "less than minimum amount");
    }

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3dfa33b5c6150bf3d64f49cb97eba351f99e4dff7119ef458e40f51160bf77ec/advanced[8]

攻击者的调用参数为：

Function: deposit(uint8 destinationDomainID, bytes32 resourceID, bytes data)

MethodID: 0x05e2ca17
 //destination
 //resource
 //offset
 //len
 //option
 //amount
 //receipient

quibit 被盗的根本原因其实在于：

他没有使用 Openzeppelin 的 safeERC20 合约，而是自己实现了一个版本的 safeERC20. 但是在它自己实现的 safeERC20 合约里面的 safeTransferFrom 方法里有 bug，没有检查 token 必须是合约地址，而不是 EOA。

在 Openzeppelin 则做了相应的检查。

function safeTransferFrom(
        address token,
        address from,
        address to,
        uint value
    ) internal {
        // bytes4(keccak256(bytes('transferFrom(address,address,uint256)')));
        (bool success, bytes memory data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd, from, to, value));
        require(success && (data.length == 0 || abi.decode(data, (bool))), "!safeTransferFrom");
    }

function functionCallWithValue(address target, bytes memory data, uint256 value, string memory errorMessage) internal returns (bytes memory) {
        require(address(this).balance >= value, "Address: insufficient balance for call");
        require(isContract(target), "Address: call to non-contract");

        // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
        (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target.call{ value: value }(data);
        return _verifyCallResult(success, returndata, errorMessage);
    }

参考资料

[1]bixia1994: https://learnblockchain.cn/people/3295

[2]交易hash: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2d3987963b77159cfe4f820532d729b0364c7f05511f23547765c75b110b629c

[3]chainbridge-solidity-v1.0.0-eth/deployed_0421/merged at master · meterio/chainbridge-solidity-v1.0.0-eth: https://github.com/meterio/chainbridge-solidity-v1.0.0-eth/tree/master/deployed_0421/merged

[4]Breaking down the Meter hack: https://medium.com/chainsafe-systems/breaking-down-the-meter-io-hack-a46a389e7ae4

[5]https://twitter.com/peckshield/status/1486841239450255362: https://twitter.com/peckshield/status/1486841239450255362

[6]tx: https://etherscan.io/address/0x80d1486ef600cc56d4df9ed33baf53c60d5a629b#code

[7]tx2: https://etherscan.io/address/0x99309d2e7265528dc7c3067004cc4a90d37b7cc3#code

[8]https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3dfa33b5c6150bf3d64f49cb97eba351f99e4dff7119ef458e40f51160bf77ec/advanced: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3dfa33b5c6150bf3d64f49cb97eba351f99e4dff7119ef458e40f51160bf77ec/advanced

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原始发表：2022-02-18，如有侵权请联系 cloudcommunity@tencent.com 删除

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